Buddhists, Brahmins and Belief

Dan Arnold examines the relationship between belief and brahmins in Buddhists, Brahmins, and how the Brahmanical tradition Purva Mimamsa, and the writings by the seventh-century Buddhist Madhyamika philosopher Candrakirti, challenged the dominant Indian Buddhist views on epistemology. Arnold identifies two distinct but equally important voices in philosophical dissent. They show that they have developed sophisticated and persuasive critiques of Buddhist epistemologists Dignaga or Dharmakirti. He developed his analysis in conversation with J.L. and William Alston, modern Western philosophers. Austin offers a new interpretation of the Indian philosophical tradition. He also suggests that premodern Indian thinkers can contribute much to current philosophical debates. Purva Mimamsa’s Madhyamaka and Candrakirti’s Madhyamaka were logically different. They opposed the influential Buddhist school that stressed the foundational nature of perception. Arnold claims that Mimamsaka’s arguments about the “intrinsic validity” of the Vedic scriptures is best understood in the context of Dignaga’s tradition of Buddhist philosophy. Although often criticized for being antithetical to “real Philosopy”, Mimamsaka thought shares many similarities with the reform epistemology which has recently influenced contemporary philosophy. Candrakirti’s arguments are, however, a principled rejection of epistemology. Arnold claims that Candrakirti uses transcendental arguments to oppose Buddhist foundationalism. This is because Arnold believes that Candrakirti’s approach is similar to twentieth-century ordinary-language philosophy. Madhyamaka’s bold new understanding is based on the conclusion that Candrakirti’s arguments support a metaphysical claim.